physical head restraint was not applied to any ejection seat of British design. The gyrations of the ejection seat during its alignment and deceleration before parachute extraction could produce high rotational loads with associated centrifugal effects, which might give rise to injury. Parachute deployment was normally delayed to a preset altitude and was time-controlled so that the opening load was within the tolerance of the parachute, but high opening loads could be the cause of injury. Injury might also occur on landing, as often the site could not be selected, and if descent drills could not be completed before landing. The commoner landing injuries were crush fractures of the spine, twists of the knee or ankle, and fracture of an extended upper limb.
The stresses to which the system and aircrew were subjected during ejection were maximal, to achieve maximum capability for the system. The most important factors in the prevention of ejection injury were the maintenance of correct posture by correct harness adjustment and the completion of the correct drill before, during and after ejection. When there was time to select the ideal speed and altitude, 230 knots (118.5 m s-1) and 9000 ft (2700 m), and to ensure correct posture and harness adjustment, no injury should be sustained.
Spinal Ejection Injuries
Air Commodore C R Griffin (Royal Air Force Central Medical Establishment, London) said that with advancing aircraft capability (the VTO aircraft) and the increasing requirement for training in low-level attack patterns, continuous research was necessary to improve the efficiency of escape systems. All ejection seats had their limitations, and the success rate of ejections was recorded under two headings: those within, and those outside seat design limits. If all criteria were fully satisfied the success rate was 94%, whereas when ejection took place outside design limits the success rate fell to 15%. Height at the time of ejection also had a bearing on the success rate; 300 ft (90 m) was apparently the critical level.
The annual incidence of spinal fractures following ejection varied between 33 % and 60 %, with an average incidence of 47.5%. In relation to aircraft type, ejections from the Hunter, Canberra and Buccaneer showed a high incidence of fractures, while the Gnat had an excellent record. When, however, the total of ejections was related to the total number of sorties per aircraft, it was evident the risk of ejection injury from a Hunter was very much lower than with other aircraft. Barwood (personal communication) showed that with the face-blind system, the incidence of fractures was 38 %, but became 69 % when the seat pan handle was used: a difference attributable to the posture adopted at the time of ejection. The face-blind system, used when urgency was not so great, allowed time to adjust the restraint harness and induced extension of the spine. The pan handle method, used in an acute emergency, allowed no time for harness adjustment and induced a slight flexion of the spine. A lower incidence of fractures was expected following the introduction of the rocketassisted ejection seat, but unfortunately the incidence still remained at 50 %.
In the RAF series the vast majority of injuries were simple compression fractures of one or more vertebre, which showed varying degrees of loss of anterior body height. The anterosuperior portion of the vertebral body was most frequently involved; the anteroinferior portion was affected in only 3 cases. The individual's height and weight did not appear to influence the incidence or site of fracture. One pilot who had ejected twice had 6 fractured vertebrn, acquiring 4 the first time and a further 2 the second; he also had spondylolisthesis of L5 on Si. In the older age group two cases had more severe injuries, including 'bursting' fractures of a dorsal vertebral body, with marked displacement of the anterior fragments and rotational deformity of the posterior part of the body; the cord must have been at near risk. Of aircrew who sustained spinal fractures, 14% had no symptoms referable to their injury and 40% were-unable to state at what stage in their escape their injury occurred. Those who had symptoms usually became painfree 4-7 days after injury. Symptoms (apart from loss of height) were not related to the degree of compression or extent of the injuries. The commonest site in both single and multiple fractures in the RAF series was at the lumbodorsal hinge. This pattern was similar to that occurring in 7 other Armed Services. Fracture-dislocations, fractures of the posterior complexes, neurological complications and disc syndromes had not been found.
In the RAF, treatment of postejection spinal fractures had been standardized. Whenever possible aircrew were referred to an RAF hospital for clinical and radiological examination; the latter was mandatory even if no symptoms appeared. If spinal fractures were evident the patient was admitted for a minimum of 3 weeks' bed rest. When he became symptom-free and had regained full spinal extension, he was returned to his unit but remained in a non-flying capacity for 3 months. On review, if he was still pain-free and had regained full spinal ranges with normal power, he was allowed to return to full flying duties including the risk of further ejection. During this review further lateral X-rays of the spine were taken, as X-rays taken immediately after injury often might not disclose minor marginal fractures; and if a second ejection occurred, the correct number of fractures could then be ascribed to each episode.
In this series three pilots (one ejecting twice) had symptomless L5-S1 spondylolisthesis with the typical pars interarticularis defect, which confirmed the clinical impression that symptomless spondylolisthesis should not be a bar to flying ejection seat aircraft. Exposure to risk of further ejection was contraindicated if there was marked residual kyphosis from extensive lesions or gross destruction of a single vertebra, e.g. loss of over half of the anterior body height of one vertebra.
Ewing had reported on 69 US Navy aircrew who suffered fractures following ejection, of whom 16 % were retired from flying duties and a further 7.2% were restricted to limited flying (Ninow 1971) . It was considered that these figures might have been reduced if the harness had incorporated an anti-G strap. Young (1973) had reviewed 116 civilians with stable compression fractures following accidents; 77% had residual complaints, 22% of which were severe enough to cause retirement or a change of work. In this series no RAF personnel had to be removed from the flying task. Only four pilots received a limited flying category, i.e. they were restricted to non-ejection seat aircraft. One case was unusual: a Harrier pilot lost power during a vertical landing and was forced to eject with the aircraft in a nose-down attitude; he was thrown into horizontal flight and struck trees head first, sustaining a fracture of Cl with residual subluxation. The second was the pilot who ejected twice; he was left with such a degree of kyphosis that adequate spinal extension could not be regained. The other two cases were those who had sustained 'bursting' fractures with gross vertebral deformities. Four other pilots complained of episodic backache, which necessitated the issue of a lumbosacral support, but in a survey of 1000 aircrew Fitzgerald & Crotty (1971) had found that 13% of RAF pilots aged between 20 and 50 years experienced backache every time they flew; 22 % experienced in-flight pain once a week and up to 40 % experienced pain at least once during the course of a month of normal flying. Crooks (1970) had reviewed RAF aircrew who had ejected in the previous 10 years. One of the additional findings in his survey was a high radiological incidence of cervical spondylosis (75 %, compared to an incidence of 50% in those who had not ejected). The relation of this high incidence to the ejection sequence required further investigation, as some of the pilots in the control group did not fly similar aircraft. Other factors might well be involved, e.g., the pilot of a highperformance aircraft had to mancuvre his head to extreme ranges for visual reasons, while exposed to buffeting and G strains and wearing a flying helmet that weighed 41 lb (2.025 kg).
Aircrew were not allowed to become complacent regarding ejection seat drills. In spite of a high rate of spinal fractures following ejection, the long-term disability was minimal. In an emergency, use of the seat pan handle method was advocated, and the greater risk of fractures was accepted; better a survivor with fractures than no survivor at all.
